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ABSTRACT 
 
Lack of information about technology and prices often hampers the empirical assessment of 
the validity of the profit maximization hypothesis. We show that the non-parametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology comprises natural tools for dealing with such 
incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the economic meaning of the DEA model 
that builds on assumptions of monotone and convex production possibility sets, and provide 
some extensions that further exploit this economic interpretation. This perspective on DEA is 
all the more attractive since its original use for technical efficiency analysis is sometimes 
questionable given its restrictive production assumptions. An application to German farm 
types complements our methodological discussion. By using nonparametric tools to test 
specific hypotheses about profit differences, we further demonstrate the potential of the non-
parametric approach in deriving strong and robust statistical evidence while imposing 
minimal structure on the setting under study.  
 
KEYWORDS: profit maximization hypothesis, Data Envelopment Analysis, non-parametric 
techniques, agriculture 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic theory represents production-allocation decisions as constrained optimization 
problems; producers optimize their objectives subject to constraints imposed by the 
production technology. Within the neoclassical paradigm, firms are typically assumed to 
maximize profits. Given its crucial role in mainstream microeconomic theory, it is interesting 
to test this assumption empirically, and to quantify deviations from it (or ‘inefficiencies’) in a 
meaningful way. Many valuable insights can be gained from tests that build on a functional 
specification of the production technology. By explicitly integrating inefficiencies in a so-
called non-maximum profit function, Khumbakar (2001) shows how conventionally 
employed calculus tools can still contribute to economists’ understanding of productive 
activities. Yet, with an eye towards the testing of the behavioral assumption of profit 
efficiency, such approaches ultimately remain restricted by the idiom of some imposed 
functional form.  This is unfortunate because reliable empirical specification tests are not 
available in many cases, and more fundamentally because economic theory is completely 
silent on this issue: profit maximization does not imply any particular functional form.  
A systematic methodology for empirical profit efficiency analysis that does not need a 
functional specification of the technology constraints originated from the work by Afriat 
(1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984), 
building on t he activity analysis approach of Koopmans (1951), the duality theory of 
Shephard (1953), the efficiency analysis approach of Farrell (1957), and the revealed 
preference theory of Samuelson (1948). This ‘revealed profitability’ methodology merely 
needs information on quantities and prices, and essentially applies the theory of convex sets to 
such data rather than considering them through the lens of a pre-specified function.  
However, the hitherto proposed tools for non-parametric profit analysis require full price 
information. Already Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) expressed their concern about the 
ability to measure prices accurately enough to make good use of economic efficiency 
measurement. For example, accounting data can give a poor approximation for  marginal 
opportunity costs because of debatable valuation schemes. And even when reliable price 
information can be retrieved, such information frequently applies only to a subset of input and 
output commodities.  
In this paper, we show that the popular Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology 
can be used to remedy the problem of incomplete price information. More specifically, we 
forward the frequently used DEA model introduced by Banker et al. (1984) as the natural 
solution for dealing with incomplete price information when assessing the validity of the 
profit maximization hypothesis. 
We note at the outset that the DEA model is commonly employed for technical efficiency 
analysis, i.e. the analysis of quantitative waste in production. Yet, even though technical 
efficiency is a necessary condition for profit efficiency, technical efficiency maximization 
does not figure as a primal behavioral motivation of our textbook  Homo Economicus.  
Moreover, the Banker  et al. DEA model has some shortcomings as a tool for technical 
efficiency analysis. The model builds on assumptions of monotone and convex production 
possibility sets, which are unsustainable in many settings. For example, monotonicity 
excludes congestion, which is frequently observed in agriculture, transportation and 
engineering; see e.g. Färe  et al. (1985). In addition, convexity assumes away indivisible 
inputs and outputs, economies of scale, and economies of specialization, of which the 
economic importance was already stressed by Farrell (1959, p. 378 – 379). McFadden (1978; 
p. 8-9) explicitly stated that the rationale for monotonicity and convexity assumptions in 
production theory lies ‘in their analytical convenience rather than in their economic realism’.   4
We cannot help but notice that, on a conceptual level, such a rationale is in fact similar to the 
justification of parametric testing methods. 
While DEA may not always fit in very nicely with microeconomic theory as a tool for 
technical efficiency analysis (although it is conventionally employed for that purpose), we re-
institute it here as a well-founded tool for profit efficiency testing and measurement. Within 
this perspective, we additionally provide some extensions of the original Banker et al. model, 
pertaining to the incorporation of monetary (cost or revenue) data for a limited number of 
commodities and the measurement of ‘mix’ (in)efficiency. 
DEA models are frequently employed for analyzing the agricultural sector; see e.g. the 
recent studies by Piesse, Thurtle and Turk (1996), Thiele and Brodersen (1999) and Mathijs 
and Swinnen (2001). However, these studies use DEA for technical efficiency assessment. 
Conversely, testing the validity of the standard profit maximization hypothesis may be 
particularly relevant for agriculture, given the peculiar circumstances of the farming business. 
Hence, we believe the agricultural sector forms a prime area for demonstrating the possible 
use of DEA for nonparametric profit efficiency analysis, and for illustrating the extensions 
that we propose. In particular, we study the profit performance of 600 German farm types in 
the period 1995-1997, and investigate specific hypotheses about differences in revealed 
profitability according to region, ownership type and production type. In line with the non-
parametric orientation of the efficiency analysis methodology, we hereby use non-parametric 
statistical testing procedures; this further demonstrates the potential of the non-parametric 
methodology in deriving powerful and robust results while imposing minimal structure on the 
(largely unobserved) setting under investigation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses methodological 
issues. Section 3 presents our application to German farm types. Finally, section 4 
summarizes and contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
To study firm choices we need a convenient way to summarize the production possibilities 
of the firm, i.e. which inputs and outputs are technologically feasible. The set of all 
technologically feasible input-output combinations is called the production possibility set. 
To formally represent that set, we denote by 
1 (,...,)
qq zzz =˛￿  a (non-zero) netput vector 
with 
j z  the netput quantity of commodity j.
1 As usual, positive components of z represent 
outputs and negative components represent inputs.  Throughout we assume that the vector z 
captures at least one input and at least one output. The production technology is represented 
by the non-empty and closed production possibility set 
(1)  { }  netput  is technically feasible
q Tzz ”˛￿ . 




jjj zzzT =˛  and denote by (non-zero) 
q
j p + ˛￿  the corresponding price 
                                                                 
1 Throughout the text we use 
q ￿  for a q-dimensional Euclidean space, and 
q
+ ￿  denotes the positive orthant. 
Slightly abusing standard notation, we further use  ( )
1,...,
bb aa ˛￿  for  ( )
1...'
bb aa ˛￿ , and  ac for  ' ac  
( ) ,
b ac˛￿ .   5
vector. Let  ( ) ( ) ,;max jjjj zT zpTpzz q
˛
Øø ”- ºß . We say that the vector  j z  is profit efficient if 
and only if it is profit maximizing over the set T, i.e. 
(2)   ( ) ( ) ,;max0 jjjj zT zpTpzz q
˛
Øø ”-= ºß . 
The measure  ( ) ,;0 jj zpT q ‡  can be interpreted as a measure for profit efficiency; higher 
values indicate worse profit efficiency performance. 
Condition (2) is readily tested if the set T and the price vector pj are perfectly observed. 
Unfortunately, in practice only limited technology and price information is usually available. 
 
PROFIT EFFICIENCY AND DEA 
To deal with the problem of limited technology information, the non-parametric approach 
to production analysis starts from the set of observed netput vectors S, and merely assumes 
that observed vectors are technically feasible, i.e.  ST ˝ .
2 Now, for  j zS ˛  we get instead of 
condition (2) 
(3)   ( ) ( ) ,;max0 jjjj zS zpSpzz q
˛
Øø =-= ºß . 
Observe that  ST ˝  implies  ( ) ( ) ,;,; jjjj zpSzpT qq £ , i.e. (3) is a necessary condition for 
(2) and  ( ) ,; jj zpS q  provides a lower bound approximation for the true profit efficiency 
measure  ( ) ,; jj zpT q . Interestingly, since S is a finite and discrete set, the computation of 
( ) ,; jj zpS q  merely involves linear programming; see e.g. Varian (1984). 
The standard non-parametric approach assumes that prices are perfectly observed. 
However, as discussed in the Introduction, reliable price information is often not available. 
We can show that the standard DEA model introduced by Banker et al. (1984) provides an 
intuitive test for condition (3) under incomplete price information. 
To see this, we first consider the extreme case where no price information at all is 
available, except from the fact that prices are non-negative, i.e. we can only impose 
{ } \0
q
jq p + ˛￿ , with  0q  the q-dimensional zero vector. A necessary condition for (3) (and 
hence for (2)) is that there exists at least one price vector under which zj is profit maximizing 
over the observed sample S, i.e. 
(4)  
{ } ( ) ( )
( )






















Obviously, given that  j zS ˛  we have  ( ) ( ) 0,;,;
Iq
jjj zSzpS qq + £￿£  for any 
q
j p + ˛￿ . 
Unfortunately, unlike the preceding measures  ( ) ,;
Iq
j zS q + ￿  cannot be considered as an 
                                                                 
2 This assumption makes abstraction of measurement errors in the input and output data. Tools for extending the 
non-parametric approach to deal with measurement errors have been proposed; see e.g. Grosskopf (1996). We 
return to the issue of measurement errors in our application in Section 3.   6
adequate efficiency gauge since no real meaning attaches to a strictly positive value. This is 
essentially due to the fact that the (positive) price vector is now endogenously selected for 
each  j zS ˛ ; if there does not exist a price vector under which zj is profit maximizing over the 
sample S, we have  ( ) ,;0
Iq
j zS q + ￿> , but the value will be infinitesimally small.  
To remedy that problem, we normalize the prices. We focus on prices that imply an input 
cost level of unity for the evaluated vector. We accordingly make the explicit distinction 
between input and output vectors, i.e. we use  ( ) y x z , - =  with 
l x + ￿ ˛  the input vector and 
ql y
-
+ ˛￿  the output vector. Similarly, we decompose  ( ) ,
IO
jjj ppp =  with 
Il
j p + ˛￿  the input 




+ ˛￿  the output price vector. Incorporating the price normalization 
constraint, condition (4) changes to 








Øø ￿”-== ºß , or 
(6)   ( )











Øø ￿=---== ºß . 
Normalizing the prices does not affect the test for profit efficiency: we still have 
( ) ,;0 jj zpS q =  for any 
q
j p + ˛￿  (with  1
I
jj px= ) only if  ( ) ,;0
INq
j zS q + ￿= .
3 Imposing that 
1
I
























where u is the maximum profit level over the sample S under the endogenously selected price 
vector  ( ) ,
IO
jjj ppp = . Again, checking (7) only requires linear programming.   
The measure  ( ) ,;
INq
j zS q + ￿  can be interpreted as the actual cost level (equaling unity) 
minus the required cost level for zj to be profit maximizing over the sample S. This reveals the 
focus on input performance when evaluating a firm’s profit efficiency for given output 
(revenue). This is often a good model to evaluate production performance; many firms pursue 
profit maximization where the controllable variables are the cost-generating inputs while the 
revenue-generating outputs should be taken as given, and it seems intuitive to measure firm 
performance only in terms of controllable dimensions. In addition, condition (7) clearly 
reveals that most favorable prices are implicitly selected for the evaluated netput vector, i.e. 
we apply ‘benefit-of-the-doubt pricing’ in the absence of full price information.
4 
The focus on input performance is also apparent from the dual formulation of (7), i.e. 
                                                                 
3 Only relative prices matter in the profit efficiency  test; if  ( ) ,;0 jj zpS q =  for some 
q
j p + ˛￿  then 
( ) ,;0 jj zpS qt =  for all  0 t > .  
4 The reader may notice some analogy between the approach advocated here and the ‘shadow price’ approach 
discussed in Färe et al. (1990). Still, the approaches differ substantially. First, Färe et al. concentrate on cost 
efficiency while our focus is on profit efficiency. More importantly, Färe  et al.  start from a continuous 
(piecewise linear) empirical representation of technology, and determine ‘shadow’ prices in a second step as the 
marginal rates of input substitution/output transformation derived from the boundary of that empirical production 
set. By contrast, the approach discussed in this paper starts directly from the observed set of netput vectors and 
does not use further production assumptions.   7
(8)   ( )







= ‡ £ - = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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z j S y x z
q
j
IN x x y y S z
z
l l q l q q
l . 
In words, we look for (one minus) the maximal equiproportional input contraction (for 
given output) within the set 





￿￿ ￿￿ ”-£‡=˛￿"=-˛ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿ , 
i.e. the convex monotone hull of the observed sample S. Recall from our discussion in the 
Introduction that convexity and monotonicity of a production possibility set is unrealistic to 
assume in many practical situations. However, convexity and monotonicity naturally ensue 
from the profit efficiency test: the optimal profit level for some price vector 
q
j p + ˛￿  over the 
set S equals that over the set CMH(S); see also Varian (1984). Hence, in contrast to the case of 
technical efficiency analysis, convexity and monotonicity are harmless assumptions when 
analyzing the standard profit maximization model. 
We illustrate these points in figure 1, which presents a one input-one output situation. To 
keep the exposition simple, the set S contains only three netput vectors, i.e.  { } 123 ,, Szzz =  
with  ( ) , jjj zxy =-  (j = 1, 2,3).  
We first consider profit efficiency when relative prices are known. Suppose that all three 
firms are to be evaluated at prices that determine the slope of the iso-profit line aa’. Given 
these prices, the vector  1 z  is profit maximizing over S and  2 z  and  3 z  are obviously profit 
inefficient. This conclusion does not change when imposing convexity and monotonicity on 
the production possibility set, i.e.  1 z  remains profit maximizing over the set CMH(S) and  2 z  
and  3 z  remain profit inefficient. 
Next, we turn to the situation of incomplete price information. We have that  2 z  can no 
longer be diagnosed as profit inefficient; there exists at least one price vector under which it 
becomes profit maximizing over S (e.g. the vector corresponding to the iso-profit line bb’). 
The vector  3 z , on the other hand, is still identified as profit inefficient; there does not exist a 
price vector such that it meets the necessary profit efficiency condition. More generally, for 
all netput vectors on the boundary of the set CMH(S) (like  1 z  and  2 z ) we can construct a price 
vector that makes these netput vectors profit maximizing over S, while the opposite holds for 
points in the interior of that set (like 3 z ). 
Finally, we can evaluate the degree of profit efficiency of an inefficient vector like  3 z  by 
using the measure  ( ) 3,;
INq zS q + ￿ ( ) 3*3 10/00 xx =-> ; the n etput vector  3 z  meets the 
necessary profit efficiency condition (8) when it reduces its input with a factor  3*3 0/0 xx . 
Profit efficiency can no longer be rejected for the resulting vector  ( ) 3*3 , xy - ; this vector is 
profit maximizing over the sample S for relative prices determining the slope of the iso-profit 
line bb’. The factor  3*3 0/0 xx  can also be interpreted as the minimally needed relative cost 
decrease for  3 z  to become profit maximizing over S when keeping the revenue level fixed. 
Clearly, the relative prices corresponding to the slope of the iso-profit line bb’ are more 
favorable for evaluating profit efficiency of  3 z  than e.g. those corresponding to  aa’ (i.e.   8
( ) ( ) 3**33*3 10/010/0 xxxx ->- ), which demonstrates the ‘benefit-of-the-doubt pricing’ 
principle that underlies  ( ) ,;
INq
j zS q + ￿  in (7).  
The figure further demonstrates why  CMH(S) is naturally associated with profit 
maximization. When checking profit efficiency one refers to iso-profit hyperplanes, and it are 
these which constitute CMH(S).  By contrast, one does not refer to iso-profit hyperplanes 
when strictly focusing on the properties of the (technical) production possibilities set, 
implying that convexity and monotonicity are to be ‘imposed’, sometimes erroneously, in the 
case of technical efficiency analysis. 
 














We are now in a position to institute the profit efficiency interpretation of the DEA model 
that Banker et al. (1984) originally proposed for technical efficiency assessment. The second 
term in (8) gives the Debreu (1951)-Farrell (1957) (DF) input efficiency measure computed 
with respect to CMH(S). For expositional convenience, we will further denote that measure as 
(10)   ( )











ºß ￿￿￿ . 
We have that  ( ) [ ] ,()0,1
DF
j zCMHS q ˛  and  ( ) ,;
INq
j zS q + ￿ = 1 ( ) ,()
DF
j zCMHS q - . 
Hence,  ( ) ,;0
INq
j zS q + ￿=  if and only if  ( ) ,()1
DF
j zCMHS q = . This unveils the  profit 
efficiency interpretation of  ( ) ,()
DF
j zCMHS q , which is precisely the efficiency measure that 
Banker  et al. (1984) proposed. In view of the foregoing discussion, we believe that 
interpreting  ( ) ,()
DF
j zCMHS q  in profit terms is better justified than interpreting it in the pure 
technical (quantity) terms for which it was originally intended. 
We provide an illustration of the DF measure for a two-input situation in figure 2. For 
simplicity, we again consider a sample of only three observations, which now all produce the   9
same output y, i.e.  { } 123 ,, Szzz =  with  ( ) , jj zxy =-  (j = 1,2,3). Under these conditions, 
( ) ,()
DF
j zCMHS q  (j = 1, 2,3) is computed as the maximal equiproportional input contraction 
within the input set bounded by the convex monotone hull of the three observed input vectors, 
i.e. within  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } , ISxxyCMHS =˛  in figure 2. For example, for the netput vector z1 we 
have  ( ) 11*1 ,()0/0
DF zCMHSxx q =   (and thus  ( ) 11*1 ,;(10/0)
INq zSxx q + ￿=- ). Because 
( ) 1,()1
DF zCMHS q < , we conclude that z1 does not pass the necessary profit efficiency test. 
Similarly, z2 and  z3 do satisfy the profit efficiency condition. 
We again stress the attractive price interpretation of the DF measure. For the netput vector 
z1  the (relative) implicit input prices used for estimating the profit efficiency measure 
correspond to the slope of the iso-cost line cc’; under these prices both x1* and x2 are cost 
minimizing over S.  These are most favorable prices for evaluating the profit efficiency of z1; 
for example, under the relative input prices that make both x2 and x3 cost minimizing over S 
(see the iso-cost line  dd’) the resulting profit efficiency measure is (1-0x1**/0x1), and 
obviously (1-0x1**/0x1)>(1-0x1*/0x1). 
 




















The efficiency condition in (10) merely uses quantity information. However, in much 
applied work (even on ‘technical’ efficiency analysis) only cost and revenue data rather than 
pure quantity data are available for individual input and output dimensions. Such revenue or 
cost information for a subset of input and output commodities can also be integrated in the 
above  framework: we construct an input subvector 
l x + ￿ ˛




+ ˛￿   ( ) 1 qlql £-£-, with one input (output) the monetary sum value of all 
inputs (outputs) for which cost (revenue) data are available while the remaining inputs 
(outputs) contain only quantity information.    10
It is easy to verify that such use of cost (or revenue) data for particular inputs (or outputs) 
is consistent with our ultimate goal to test necessary conditions for (3) if the following two 
conditions are satisfied for the inputs and outputs contained in the monetary subvectors.
5 First, 
the observed monetary values should reliably reflect the true cost/revenue values faced by 
firms. Second, all firms should face the same prices for the input and output commodities.
6 
Using vectors 
* x  and 
* y  instead of the original (quantity) vectors x and y in (7) (or (8)) 
actually implies a hybrid form of the ‘full price information’ condition (3) and the ‘no price 
information’ condition (5): actual prices are used for determining the relative value within the 
subvectors of inputs and outputs for which reliable price information is available, while 
implicit, most favorable prices are used for determining relative values within the subvectors 
for which no reliable price information is available. Evidently, most favorable prices must 




ZERO PRICES AND MIX EFFICIENCY 
From our above discussion, we know that using  ( ) ,()
DF
j zCMHS q  implies testing for 
profit maximization under ‘benefit-of-the-doubt pricing’. Inconveniently though, the selection 
of most favorable prices does not exclude  zero prices; see the single price restriction 
Il




+ ˛￿  in (7). Intuitively however, we are inclined to label a netput vector as 
profit efficient if and only if it is profit maximizing over the production possibility set under a 
strictly positive price vector; this notion of profit efficiency is consistent with the fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics.  
The possibility of zero implicit prices has a direct interpretation in quantity terms; the DF 
measure may label a  netput vector as efficient when it is actually still characterized by 
‘wasteful production’ as compared to other vectors in the reference input set. Specifically, 
after maximum equiproportional input adjustment it may still be possible to further reduce 
some individual inputs.  
As an illustration, we take again our example of figure 2. In that example, the input vector 
x1* (the DF reference vector of x1) is efficient according to the equiproportional DF measure 
while it exhibits waste in the second input dimension. In price terms, x1* is cost minimizing 
over the sample only if a zero implicit price is accorded to the second input; x1* produces y at 
a higher cost level than x2 for any positive price accorded to that input. 
Cherchye and Van Puyenbroeck (2000) developed a general shadow price framework for 
technical efficiency assessment that solves this problem associated with the DF efficiency 
measure. Specifically, as residual inefficiency not captured by DF measures typically pertains 
to the adopted input and output mixes (see e.g. figure 2), they make the distinction between 
DF and ‘mix efficiency’. We will here summarize the main ideas pertaining to the proposed 
treatment of zero implicit prices and mix inefficiency, and refer to the aforementioned paper 
for a more rigorous analysis.  
Intuitively, the zero shadow price problem can be overcome by searching for an alternative 
reference vector.  Inspection of figure 2 strongly suggests to take the vertex point x2, since x2 
is not only supported by the same iso-cost line (cc’) as x1*, but can additionally be supported 
                                                                 
5 Färe  et al.  (1994) forward similar conditions in their discussion on efficiency assessment when cost and 
revenue data rather than pure quantity data are available.  
6 Price variation is possible only if it corrects for quality difference, i.e. differences in prices should make the 
goods ‘homogenous’.    11
by many other iso-cost lines (one of which is dd’) with strictly positive prices. Consequently, 
a complementary measure of mix efficiency has to provide information on the (appropriately 
defined) distance between  x1* and x2.  Since  1*2 xx ‡  a natural measure for evaluating this 





== = ￿￿. In general, 
a mix efficiency measure can thus be defined as 



























Øø ￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ ￿￿ £‡ ￿￿ Œœ ￿￿ Łł
” Œœ ￿￿
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with  ( ) ,()
DF
jRjj xzCMHSx q =·  the reference input vector used to compute the DF input 
measure for the evaluated vector  j z  (i.e. x1* in our example).  
The only caveat is that proceeding as such would imply that mix efficiency measurement is 
sensitive to the units in which each input dimension is measured. In our example, if the 
second input (say labor) is no longer measured in hours but in days, we would end up with a 
smaller fraction  21* / xx .   
Dividing each original input quantity by a value expressed in the same measurement unit 
can solve this problem. Extending this line of reasoning to the multidimensional case, 
Cherchye and Van Puyenbroeck showed that one such ‘units invariant’ alternative for (11) is 

























Øø ￿￿ £‡˛ Œœ ￿￿
” Œœ ￿￿




Thus,  ( ) [ ] ,()0,1
M
j zCMHS q ˛  minimizes the arithmetic mean of the (uni-dimensional) 
input contraction factors for the DF reference vector.
7 Given the economic perspective we are 
upholding in this paper, we additionally note that this mix efficiency measure also bears an 
economic (price) interpretation, viz. as a dominance measure in price space. Loosely stated, 
and looking again at the example, the fact that x2 demonstrably has a more efficient input mix 
than x1* can be translated into dual (price) terms by the claim that, given the same cost-level 
(of unity), x2 can always ‘afford’ higher unit prices than x1*.  
It is easy to verify that the computation of  ( ) ,()
M
j zCMHS q  once more only involves 
linear programming since we can first compute the minimum value under the square root 
operator in (12), and apply the simple positive monotone transformation of the thus obtained 
solution afterwards.  
Finally note that the two components of profit performance (DF input efficiency, captured 
in  ( ) ,()
DF
j zCMHS q , and input mix efficiency, captured in  ( ) ,()
M
j zCMHS q ) can be 
combined in a single, aggregated efficiency measure 
                                                                 
7 Sahoo and Sengupta (2001) provide an empirical assessment of this particular mix efficiency measure.   12
(13)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ,(),(),()
ADFM
jjj zCMHSzCMHSzCMHS qqq ”· , 
with  ( ) [ ] ,()0,1
A
j zCMHS q ˛  and higher values indicating better  profit efficiency 
performance.  It follows that zj is profit maximizing under strictly positive prices only if 
( ) ( ) ,(),()
DFM
jj zCMHSzCMHS qq ==   ( ) ,()1
A
j zCMHS q = .
8 
It is worth pointing out that the measure  ( ) ,()
A
j zCMHS q  closely resembles the Zieschang 
(1984) (technical) efficiency measure. The mere difference is the square root in the definition 
of  ( ) ,()
M
j zCMHS q . Interestingly, the Zieschang measure has attractive axiomatic (‘well-
behavedness’) properties for the CMH(S) reference set (see e.g. Ferrier et al., 1994), which 
carry over to the (economic) efficiency measure  ( ) ,()
A
j zCMHS q . 
Using the comprehensive measure (13), we can quickly check whether a certain zj can be 
considered as consistent with profit maximization under strictly positive prices, as this 
amounts to  ( ) ,()1
A
j zCMHS q = . But, as our above discussion makes clear, the two 
components of  ( ) ,()
A
j zCMHS q  provide information about basically two distinct dimensions 
of efficiency performance. Therefore, in our application in the next section we pay special 
attention to the individual DF and mix efficiency components. 
We conclude this section by recapturing our earlier example. In figure 2, input vectors x2 
and x3 are both mix and DF efficient. We know that x1 is DF inefficient and mix inefficient. 
The mix efficiency measure  ( ) 1,()
M zCMHS q =  21* (10()'/0()')/2 xx Øø + ºß  compares x1* to x2, 
and the comprehensive measure  ( ) 1,()
A zCMHS q  compares x1 (or z1) to x2 (or z2). Observe 
that, i f the input vector x1* were actually observed, it would be DF efficient but not mix 
efficient: it does not meet the necessary profit efficiency condition outlined above. Notice that 
the reverse situation is also possible: netput vectors can be mix efficient but DF inefficient.  
 
3. APPLICATION 
We apply the proposed methodology to a sample of German farms over the two seasons 
1995-1996 and 1996-1997.  Thiele and Brodersen (1999) analyzed the technical efficiency of 
this sample. We complement their analysis with results for profit efficiency.
9 We first describe 
the application setting, and motivate why this setting is well suited for applying the non-
parametric methodology presented in the previous section. Subsequently, we review the most 
interesting results of  our exercises. For ease of notation, we use 
k q  for 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,,,




                                                                 
8 Imposing an additional output mix efficiency requirement can further strengthen this necessary condition for 
profit maximization; the treatment of output mix efficiency is readily analogous to that of input mix efficiency. 
However, since we focus on inputs as the controllable performance dimensions, we do not discuss output mix 
efficiency in this paper. In addition, in our application discussed in the next section there is only one output, and 
so the possibility of output mix inefficiency is excluded. 
9 We thank Holger Thiele for generously providing the data.   13
SETTING 
The original data set contains 8773 farms per season (i.e. approximately 1.5 percent of the 
total population of German farms), and is grouped in 600 farm types, where each 'farm-type 
observation' is an average of (at least 3) farms with a similar total gross margin potential. The 
fact that groups of similar farms are used as observational units is interesting because the non-
parametric approach builds directly on the observed data and therefore is very sensitive to 
measurement errors; evidently, using group data averages out  -at least to some extent- 
measurement errors in individual observations. In addition, the fact that the n on-parametric 
orientation builds on a convex monotone hull of the observed input-output vectors makes it 
sensitive to sampling error, i.e. efficiency tests may lack discriminatory power in small 
samples (see e.g. Simar and Wilson, 2000, for a more elaborate discussion of this sampling 
error problem). From that perspective, the fact that the sample consists of as much as 600 
observations is attractive in that it makes the application of the non-parametric methodology 
meaningful; we can argue that the observed sample provides a good representation of the true 
production technology. Furthermore, consistency results that have been established for the 
non-parametric DEA-model that we apply here suggest that the interdependency problem -i.e. 
the fact that any obtained efficiency value is found upon comparison with CMH(S), and in 
that sense depends on the exact location of all observed netput vectors- diminishes for large 
samples. Hence, these asymptotic results  inter alia imply that we can have reasonable 
confidence in test results aimed at comparing different ‘independent’ subgroups of our sample 
(see e.g. Banker et al., 1999, and Simar and Wilson, 2000).  
The original data set consists of five inputs (labor units per farm (I1), hectares managed by 
the farm (I2), capital in Euro (I3), variable inputs (seeds, fertilizer, etc.) in Euro (I4) and 
miscellaneous inputs (electricity, water, etc.) in Euro (I5)) and three outputs (crop returns in 
Euro (O1), livestock returns in Euro (O2) and miscellaneous returns in Euro (O3)); see Thiele 
and Brodersen (1999) for more details. Thus, for three inputs (I3, I4 and I5) and all three 
outputs monetary data (i.e. cost and revenue data) are available. Following the method 
outlined in Section 2, we use this monetary information to end up with three inputs (I1, I2, 
and I3+I4+I5) and a single, aggregated output variable (01+02+03).
10 Further, it is reasonable 
to assume that only the inputs are the controllable variables for the farm managers, while the 
output (revenue) should be treated as exogenously given. Hence, we will adopt the input 
orientation discussed in Section 2. 
The sample can be decomposed along three dimensions. First, we can distinguish between 
regions: data are available for seven federal länder of former West Germany ((a) Schleswig 
Holstein, (b) Lower Saxony, (c) North Rhine-Westphalia, (d) Hesse, (e) Rhineland-Platinate, 
(f) Baden-Württemberg and (g) Bavaria) and for five federal länder of former East Germany 
((a) Brandenburg-Berlin, (b) Saxony-Anhalt, (c) Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, (d) 
Thuringia and (e) Saxony). Second, we can group farms according to ownership type: (a) 
individual farms, (b) partnerships, and (c) companies and co-operatives. The latter farm 
category is only found in the East German länder since it consists of ‘large–scale successor 
organizations’ (LSOs) of former collective and state farms. Finally, we have data for different 
production types: (a) crop farms, (b) livestock farms, (c) pig and poultry farms, and (d) mixed 
farms.  Table 1 shows the composition of the sample. 
 
                                                                 
10 Recall that we thus assume that all German farm types face the same (quality-corrected) prices for I3, I4 and 
I5 and O1, O2 and O3. In the absence of more price information, it seems indeed plausible that price differences 
(over regions, ownership types and production types) for the respective commodities are essentially due to 
quality differences.   14
Table 1: Number of observed farms per category 
  Private farms  Partnerships  LSOs   
        Row totals 
Pig and Poultry farms  3 + 42  4 + 11  7 + 0  14 + 53 
Crop farms  72 + 136  10 + 30  13 + 0  95 +156 
Livestock farms  67 + 111  10 + 14  12 + 0  89 + 125 
Mixed Production  4 + 41  2 + 11  10 + 0  16 + 52 
         
Column totals  146 + 330  26 + 56  42 + 0  214 + 386 
Note: the first number refers to East German farms, the second number to West German farms. 
 
We investigate whether there are statistically significant differences in profit efficiency 
according to production structure, region, or ownership structure.  Similar research questions 
have appeared elsewhere; see Sarris et al. (1999) for a discussion and survey of empirical 
results pertaining to eastern European agriculture. Many DEA studies address hypothesis 
testing through superficial (graphical) interpretation of individual efficiency results, and do 
not use well-established testing techniques. Alternatively, parametric methods are used to 
explain DEA efficiency values, e.g. Tobit regression techniques as in Mathijs and Swinnen 
(2001). This seems at odds with a general non-parametric orientation, as it implies imposing 
parametric structure on the unknown distribution of the inefficiencies.   
The alternative that we employ rests on simple non-parametric statistical testing 
procedures. Most of the tests below can be found in classical textbooks on non-parametric 
statistics (e.g. Marascuilo and McSweeney, 1977; or Hollander and Wolfe, 1999). A prime 
reason for adhering to distribution-free methods relates to the distribution of efficiency values, 
which cannot be thought of as Gaussian. For example, using the Shapiro-Wilk test, we obtain 
a probability value of less than 0.0001 for the 
DF q -values.  The normal distribution fits even 
less for the 
M q -values.  Recalling how the 
A q -values are constructed, it is rather unsurprising 
that also in that case the working hypothesis of normality is highly questionable. 
One way to proceed would be to look for other ‘underlying’ parametric distributions (e.g. 
exponential, half-normal or beta distributions). We deliberately do not opt for this route in this 
paper, but instead apply non-parametric testing tools to investigate hypotheses about profit  
efficiency differences.  
Specifically, we employ non-parametric techniques to compare subsamples of production 
units. Some authors (e.g. Brockett and Golany, 1996; Thiele and Brodersen, 1999; Talluri et 
al., 2000) have applied similar techniques in combination with DEA, albeit that such research 
does not focus on profit efficiency. One aim of this section is to present a more 
comprehensive toolkit of (still fairly standard) testing techniques and thus to further 
underscore the particular attractiveness of non-parametric statistics in conjunction with non-
parametric (profit) efficiency analysis.   In addition, our methodology allows for 
distinguishing between  DF efficiency and ‘mix efficiency’.  Particularly, many of the tests 
below address the question whether there are significant differences in the frequency 
distribution (or the median) of the efficiency measures 
DF q , 
M q ,
A q  associated with different 
groups (in terms of region, ownership type and production type).  In checking the validity of 
the conventional profit maximization model for German farm types, we thus follow the 
original suggestion of Farrell (1957) that “it is to such frequency distributions that we must 
look for a measure of the success of the analysis, corresponding to the multiple correlation 
coefficient in regression analysis” (p. 270).  Varian (1990) expressed the same idea of looking 
at frequency distributions of economically meaningful measures of profit maximization,   15
stating that “the pattern of violation can tell us a lot about what is going on in the data” (p. 
130). It are precisely such patterns of violation that we try to discern in our empirical analysis.   
 
 FARMS AS FACTORIES? 
The dataset compiled by Thiele en Brodersen (1999) considers farms with different kinds 
of output specialization. We here use this decomposition to examine whether there are 
systematic differences between the profit efficiency values of crop farms, livestock farms, pig 
and poultry farms and mixed farms. 
Given that our purpose is to test the empirical validity of the profit maximization 
hypothesis, such differences may be expected a priori.  It suffices to recall that the basic 
assumption, as tested on the basis of condition (2), explicitly considers a non-random relation 
between individual input decisions and realized profits. Yet if profit uncertainty enters the 
picture, e.g. because outputs vulnerable to weather conditions are not sold in futures markets, 
this behavioral assumption obviously has some drawbacks. Theoretically, it neglects any 
impact of the producer’s degree of risk aversion and (subjective) beliefs on his productive 
decisions.  Furthermore, to the extent that farms are hit by idiosyncratic shocks, this may bear 
on their empirical relative profit efficiency performance. This observation becomes a key 
concern if one’s focus would shift (similar to many research in this area) from ‘testing the 
empirical validity of the yardstick’ to the far more normative exercise of ‘assessing individual 
performance in terms of the yardstick’. 
Figure 3 confirms that the yardstick of profit maximization is indeed more applicable to 
some farm types than to others.  It is moreover in line with the foregoing comments that this is 
manifestly the case for pig and poultry farms, the subcategory that is least prone to natural 
risks during the productive process. 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative frequency polygons of 
A q -values for different production types 
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Table 2 provides further clarification of the differences in these frequency distributions; 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov results confirm that there is no statistical support for the hypothesis that 
the profit efficiency values for pig and poultry farms have a similar distribution as each of the   16
other three farm types. This result holds for the aggregate measure, for its DF component, and 
in two of the three cases also for its mix component. Mutual comparisons between the other 
farm types reveal a less clear picture: crop farms are not significantly different from livestock 
or mixed farms on account of the 
A q -values (see also figure 3), although there is a clear 
difference if we concentrate on mix inefficiency.
11 The reverse picture appears when 
comparing livestock farms to mixed farms.   
The numbers displayed in table 2 refer to non-directional hypotheses.  An alternative 
thesis, viz. that the efficiency values of pig and poultry farms are stochastically larger than 
those of the other three types, is confirmed at least as firmly as the general test for merely 
‘different’ distributions.
12   
 
Table 2: Differences between production types 
  Mixed  Livestock  Crop 
Pig and Poultry       
DF q   < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
M q   ￿  < 0.001  < 0.001 
A q   < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Crop       
DF q   ￿  ￿   
M q   < 0.001  < 0.005   
A q   ￿  ￿   
Livestock       
DF q   < 0.05     
M q   ￿     
A q   < 0.01     
Note: entries show the probability when the null hypothesis of equal distributions is true, as 
computed on the basis of a two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; ‘ ￿’ indicates that this 
probability is at least 0.1. 
 
A supplementary way to approach the uncertainty issue is to investigate whether there are 
any significant differences in the dispersion of the profit efficiency values of pig and poultry 
farms vis à vis the other farm types.  With the population medians unknown, but in all 
likelihood different, a Moses test was used to examine whether the variance of profit 
efficiency values of pig and poultry farms is generally lower than that associated with other 
farm types. We find weak statistical support for this thesis in the case of 
DF q - and 
A q -values 
(the probability values associated with the test statistics being approximately 0.12 and 0.13 
respectively).  Equal dispersion of 
M q -values can however be rejected (given that the 
corresponding test statistic has a probability value of less than 0.0001).
13 
                                                                 
11 A figure similar to figure 5 reveals that the cumulative frequency polygon of crop farms is consistently ‘on 
top’ of the other three, indicating that the corresponding mix efficiency values are consistently lower.  The 
reverse holds for pig and poultry farms. 
12 Probability values computed on the basis of the chi-square approximation for such one-tailed tests are nowhere 
higher than 5 · 10
-5, except for the comparison of the ?
M-values with mixed farms, for which the probability 
value equals 0.067. 
13 For each efficiency measure, the results were obtained by considering random subsets of size 5; 13 subsets in 
the case of pig and poultry farms and 106 subsets for all other types. Given the random nature of the Moses test,   17
These first tests support the thesis that some farming subcategories –not surprisingly those 
dubbed pig and poultry ‘factories’– conform better to the neoclassical definition of the firm 
than others.  More generally, we think these tests demonstrate that there is often a need to 
consciously deal with uncertainty when discussing profit efficiency. 
 
OWNERSHIP, PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS AND PROFIT EFFICIENCY 
We next look at the possible effect of organizational form on profit efficiency.  Such an 
effect may exist, following the line of research which states that moral hazard is less of a 
problem in private farms than in partnerships and –to an even greater extent- in LSOs.  Private 
ownership implies that the farmer is residual claimant and that the incentive to free ride is 
largely mitigated. Also, effort monitoring is easiest in private farms, which should be revealed 
by relatively favorable results in an empirical test of profit efficiency. Conversely, principal-
agent problems will become more of an issue in partnerships, and even more in LSOs (see e.g. 
Schmitt, 1991; and Allen and Lueck, 1998). 
Using regression analysis, Mathijs and Swinnen (2001) indeed f ound that ownership 
matters for efficiency, but that this result depends on the output specialization of the farm: the 
agricultural activity in itself can affect moral hazard and effort monitoring (see their example 
of livestock production versus easier-to-monitor and less labor intensive crop production).  As 
we maintain the idea of non-parametric testing, we used ranks as the dependent variable in a 
two-way ANOVA to get some information on this issue.  In order to account for differences 
in production type, we first used an ‘aligned ranks’ method (see e.g. the Hodges-Lehman tests 
as described in Marascuilo and McSweeney, 1977), which boils down to an approach 
whereby, prior to ranking, mean production type effects are neutralized by subtracting a 
correction factor from the original efficiency values.  For instance, the average 
A q -value of 
pig and poultry farms is 0.829, which is higher than the sample average of 0.676.  This 
positive block effect (0.153) is then subtracted from the efficiency value of each pig and 
poultry farm.  A similar procedure is followed for the other production types.
14 The upper part 
of table 3 summarizes our findings. The first row shows the sum of aligned ranks per column, 
divided by the total number of observations per column to account for the unbalanced nature 
of the original two-way layout. Low values thus reveal a high average overall ranking.  
Hence, taking into account the mean production type effect we observe that private farms (the 
first column) perform significantly better . 
Aligned rankings make good use of ‘between block’ information and allow for a rather 
clear summary representation, but the associated test statistics do not depend on the ranks of 
the original observations. Alternative, completely d istribution-free two-way ANOVA 
procedures are fundamentally based on ‘within block’ rankings rather than aligned rankings 
over the entire sample. The lower part of table 3 presents such distribution-free test statistics, 
obtained by using the Mack and Skillings (1980) procedure. The first row displays weighted 
sums of cell ranks for the different ownership types.
15  These values are to be compared with 
the expected mean value if ownership has no effect on the rankings.  The difference between 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
the values reported in the main text are based on the biweighted mean of (3 ·) 20 test runs.  Alternative statistics, 
such as trimmed means, yield qualitatively similar results. 
14 The block effects for these other types are all negative (meaning that the associated average efficiency value is 
below the average for the entire sample).  Specifically, we have a correction factor of –0.05 for crop farms, -0.08 
for livestock farms, and –0.03 for mixed production farms. These numbers are consistent with the results 
displayed in figure 3. 
15 The weights are equal to the inverse of the number of observations per production type.  Furthermore the ranks 
in each cell are only based on the relative performance vis-à-vis farms of the same production type, i.e. ‘within a 
block’ as indicated in the main text.   18
the actually observed sum of ranks and the expected mean is displayed in the second row. We 
again find that private farms have a lower ranking than expected under the null hypothesis, 
while the opposite holds for the two other types. 
Similar exercises can be carried out  when reversing the roles of production types and 
ownership types, so checking for main effects of production types on profit efficiency.  These 
and related issues are discussed more elaborately in Appendix A. 
 
Table 3: Ownership and profit efficiency with corrections for production type 
  Private farms  Partnerships  LSOs 
Sum of aligned interblock ranks       
  275.86  355.18  475.95 
Difference with       
Partnerships  -79.32 (a)     
LSOs  -200.09 (a)  -120.77 (a)   
       
Weighted sum of intrablock ranks       
(observed)  220.29  48.90  32.81 
       
Difference with expected (b)  -19.20  7.57  11.63 
Note:  (a) indicates that the differences in mean rankings for different ownership types are 
significant at the 0.05 level, following the comparison procedure outlined in Marascuilo and 
McSweeney (1977, p. 410-414); (b) indicates that the associated value of the Mack-Skillings 
test statistic (57.51) implies a rejection of the null hypothesis that ownership has no effect on 
the rankings. 
The previously proposed framework further allows  us to check whether there are 
systematic differences between ownership types as regards the occurrence of implicit zero 
prices.  Here, this is particularly interesting as the moral hazard problem primarily relates to 
one specific input. Indeed, if principal-agent problems exist, one expects that labor will more 
frequently be ‘wasteful’ for LSOs and –to a somewhat lesser extent- partnerships. This 
hypothesized link between farm ownership and moral hazard problems is corroborated for our 
data as the ‘labor’-column in table 4 shows. 
 
Table 4: Farm ownership and implicit zero factor prices 
  Labor  Land  Miscellaneous 
Private farms  0.6  49.8  50.2 
Partnerships  11.0  56.1  22.0 
LSOs  85.7  90.5  0 
Note: entries should be interpreted as follows: the ‘most favorable farm-specific shadow price’ 
associated with labor is zero for 0.6 percent of all private farms in the sample, for 11 percent of 
all partnerships in the sample, etc. 
 
Table 4 provides some additional insights. The pattern in the last column indicates that 
partnerships are more successful than private farms in passing the minimal optimal allocation 
test for miscellaneous inputs. One possible explanation could be that partnerships allow for 
gains of task specialization, which may be particularly large for tasks such as general 
management decisions, pesticide application, etc. (see Allen and Lueck, 1998).  
Unfortunately, the dataset provides no information on task specialization within farms, and a 
direct test of this hypothesis is therefore impossible.
16  The result that land is ‘wasted’ so often 
                                                                 
16 Extending this line of reasoning, gains from specialization seem even more persistent in LSOs. The positive 
impact of (even more) specialized managers on allocative decisions would then show up by a very low number 
in the third column of the last row in table 3.  We stress however that one must be cautious with the   19
(see the second column) may be due to its fixed nature and the existence of random 
production shocks.
17  An alternative explanation for the results of the land factor starts from 
the recognition that we ignore any possible regional (in casu East-West) variation in table 4.  
Upon decomposing each entry in the table, we indeed find some indications for such 
differences.  To take the most striking example, the land/partnerships entry in table 4 (56.1%) 
actually conceals a figure of 92.3% for eastern partnerships and of 39.3% for their western 
counterparts. We will return to this issue shortly. However, to conclude our discussion of 
moral hazard we emphasize that regionally decomposed implicit factor price figures are far 
more stable for labor (the highest East-West difference –for partnerships– amounts to merely 




Interesting patterns of violation  may also ensue from a regional breakdown of the profit 
efficiency measure. Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test directly confirm that it is extremely 
unlikely that the länder-specific efficiency values are samples which are all drawn from the 
same population: for 
DF q , 
M q  and 
A q  the corresponding values of the Kruskal-Wallis test 
statistics have probability values of 4.42 · 10
-40, 1.02 · 10
-26 and 6.25 · 10
-46, respectively. 
Such overwhelming evidence of overall inter-regional differences leads to the more 
specific question which länder are actually different.  Table 5 provides a succinct overview of 
pair-wise comparisons between länder, with the upper triangular part displaying results on the 
basis of the rankings of the comprehensive efficiency measure (13) and the lower triangular 
part focusing on comparisons of the mix-efficiency measure (12). While there is no evidence 
for an impact due to differing geographical characteristics (e.g. between the  northerly 
lowlands and more mountainous areas), there is an apparent distinction between two blocks in 
the table, to wit, (former) West German länder and East German länder.  This partition is 
significant for the aggregate efficiency measure as well as for the mix efficiency measure. 
(Results for the DF values, which are not displayed, are similar to those for the aggregate 
efficiency measure.)   These results substantiate the frequent practice in applied work to 
consider farms in transition economies a priori different from farms in market economies. 
Consistent with such approaches, and backed up by the results in table 5, we treat former 
West German and East German farms as two different groups in our remaining analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
interpretation of the zero value in that table. There is an additional factor at play, to wit, the fact that there are 
already many zero shadow prices for the other two inputs in the LSO case.  As figure 3 clearly reveals, one 
cannot have relative zero prices in all input dimensions simultaneously after radial projection on a facet of 
CMH(S).  
17  While the difference between LSOs and the other two ownership types for ‘land’ seems quite startling, we 
think this feature can largely be explained by land quality differences.  As noted by Thiele and Brodersen (1999, 
p. 338-339), “companies and co-operatives produce to a greater extent in areas with lower yield potential”.  
Since the original data are silent on such quality differences, we can evidently expect the result that LSOs 
perform relatively worse in terms of this particular input.   20
Table 5: Pairwise comparisons of inter-länder rank differences 
 
  SH  NI  NW  HE  RP  BW  BY  BB  ST  MV  SN  TH 
SH    ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++ 
NI  ￿    ￿  ￿  +  +  ￿  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++ 
NW  ￿  ￿    ++  ++  ++  ￿  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++ 
HE  ￿  ￿  ￿    ￿  ￿  ￿  +++  +  +++  +++  +++ 
RP  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿    ￿  ￿  +++  ++  +++  +++  +++ 
BW  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿      +++  ++  +++  +++  +++ 
BY  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿    +++  +++  +++  +++  +++ 
BB  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***    ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
ST  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  **  ￿    ￿  ￿  ￿ 
MV  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ￿  ￿    ￿  ￿ 
SN  ***  ***  ***  **  ***  ***  *  ￿  ￿  ￿    ￿ 
TH  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿   
Note: in the upper (lower) triangular part, ‘+++’, ‘++’ and ‘+’ (‘***’ ‘**’ and ‘*’) indicate that 
the difference of the mean ranks of the  A q -values ( M q -values) between two regions is larger 
than a threshold value consistent with an overall significance level of 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05, 
respectively; SH: Schleswig Holstein; NI: Lower Saxony; NW: North Rhine-Westphalia, HE: 
Hessen; RP: Rhineland-Platinate; BW: Baden-Württemberg, BY: Bavaria; BB: Brandenburg-
Berlin; ST: Saxony-Anhalt, MV: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; SN: Saxony; TH: 
Thuringia. 
 
PERSISTENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST? 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative frequency distributions of the 
A q -measure for West German 
and East German farms. For each of the two seasons covered in the dataset, violations of the 
profit maximization model were stochastically larger in former East Germany.  In this very 
short time span we find no evidence of catching up: the median of all possible w est-east 
differences in 
A q -scores is 0.193 in 1995-1996 and this robust location-shift estimator 
actually increases slightly to 0.200 in the next season.  Indeed, the figure reveals that both 
subsamples experienced a slight profit efficiency improvement in the second season. Still, we 
reckon the overall period covered by our dataset to be too short to meaningfully talk about 
technological progress, and  therefore confine ourselves to a static analysis .  Evidently, also 
in the static case the assumption of equally distributed efficiency values is highly improbable, 
as can quickly be confirmed by e.g. a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (the probability 




                                                                 
18 The same observation holds for the two components of 
A q : the p-value for 
DF q -values is 8.84 · 10
-42, and 
9.68 · 10
-37 for the 
M q -values.   21
Figure 4: Profit efficiency values: East versus West  
 
This general picture remains unaltered on a more disaggregate level: table 6 reveals that 
the persistent difference between the distribution of the efficiency values remains, whether we 
focus on certain farm subcategories or on different ownership types; the sole exception relates 
to the pig and poultry ‘factories’ discussed earlier.
19 
 
Table 6: Efficiency values and East-West rank differences for production and 
ownership types 
 
  Average ?
DF-values  Average ?
M-values (a)   Rank differences (b) 
  West  East  West  East  DF q  
M q  
Production types             
   Crop farms  0.71  0.57  0.97  0.92  0.00  0.00 
   Livestock farms  0.69  0.52  0.97  0.94  0.00  0.00 
   Pig and poultry farms 0.86  0.81  0.98  0.93  0.47  0.12 
   Mixed production  0.72  0.53  0.98  0.91  0.00  0.00 
Ownership types             
   Individual farms  0.73  0.57  0.97  0.94  0.00  0.00 
   Partnerships  0.70  0.49  0.98  0.93  0.00  0.00 
   Companies    0.64    0.90     
   Co-operatives    0.54    0.90     
Notes: (a) given the different construction of the ?
DF-measure and the ?
M -measure, the values 
in column 1 (2) cannot readily be compared with the corresponding values in column 3 (4), i.e. 
one should not promptly conclude that  DF-efficiency is ‘consistently lower than’ mix-
efficiency; (b) results of Mann-Whitney tests; entries show the one-tailed normal probabilities 
associated with the hypothesis that the median efficiency values of East German and West 
German farm types are equal. 
                                                                 
19 It is not a coincidence that our values for the  ?
DF-values are lower than those reported in Thiele and 
Brodersen’s table 5, as tests based on profit efficiency have more discriminatory power than tests based on 
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Due to the highly unbalanced nature of the dataset (recall table 1), a satisfactorily overall 
statistical examination (e.g. via log-linear analysis) of  ceteris paribus differences between 
East- and West Germany is not feasible. Yet, for some combinations of production and 
ownership types there are enough data for at least an exploratory comparison.  For instance, 
focusing on individual livestock farms, we find that the average ?
DF –value in East Germany 
amounts to only 0.54, versus 0.70 in West Germany.  Of course, this can be complemented 
with a comparison of the ?
M-values.  We here briefly bring up a particularly appealing variant 
of the latter exercise, viz. to look at East-West differences on the basis of the uni-dimensional 
shrinkage factors that underlie ?
M (see (12)).  Such a detailed analysis reveals an outspoken 
difference between East German farms and West German farms for the input factor land; see  
table 7. 
 
Table 7: Some detailed comparisons between East and West 
  Average ?
DF –
value (East/West) 
Average shrinkage factor per input  
(East / West) 
Farm type    Labor  Land  Miscellaneous 
         
Individual livestock  0.54 / 0.70  0.99 / 1  0.77 / 0.93  0.87 / 0.82 
Individual crop  0.60 / 0.71  1.00 / 0.99  0.57 / 0.85  0.88 / 0.92 
Livestock partnerships  0.40 / 0.58  1.00 / 0.99  0.63 / 0.97  0.99 / 0.93 
Crop partnerships  0.47 / 0.66  0.99 / 0.94  0.25 / 0.86  1.00/ 0.94 
 
Putting things into the right perspective, we emphasize that the results in tables 6 and 7 
merely indicate that the profit maximization model, even when applying benefit-of-the-doubt 
pricing, seems less pertinent for the subsample of East German farms.  This is obviously not 
tantamount to saying that profit maximization is a less pertinent behavioral assumption for 
East German farmers; it could be that there are other factors at play.  By revealing important 
differences in slacks related to land use, table 7 actually provides a first indication for this, 
notably if we take into account existing imperfections in agricultural land markets, the 
unwillingness of land owners to make long-term investments in land improvement, the fact 
that land leasing occurs far more often in former East Germany, etc. (see e.g. Sarris et al. 
(1999) for a more elaborate discussion).
20 More generally, our empirical results on mix-
inefficiency lend some support to the concluding statement of Thiele and Brodersen (1999) 
that, given delayed adjustment, incomplete factor markets, and government intervention 
during transition, “the inefficiencies of East German farms are not so much a matter of 
differences in ownership and production types, but rather the result of  sub-optimal input 
allocation” (p. 345, our emphasis).  Indeed, the mix efficiency measure ?
M provides the 
moderate consistency check whether benefit-of-the-doubt input price vectors –appealing to 
use whenever there are doubts about using ‘market’ prices– contain zero entries, which may 
exactly be regarded as a necessary condition for optimal input allocation. We refer to 
appendix B for additional tests of the relative influence of the two components ?
DF and ?
M on 
the overall profit efficiency measure ?
A for East and West German farms. 
 
                                                                 
20 Although Thiele and Brodersen (1999) make some critical comments on the lack of quality adjusted land data 
in the dataset, they refer to other sources to state that land-quality differences between East and West are on 
average very small. Note that this is not consistent with our earlier remark in footnote 17, where we only focused 
on LSOs.   23
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Standard non-parametric tests for profit efficiency conveniently do not require a parametric 
specification of the technology. But they do require full price information, which is often 
problematic in practical applications. Starting from this observation, we have forwarded the 
DEA model proposed by Banker et al. (1984) as the natural alternative for assessing profit 
efficiency in a non-parametric way when reliable information about the true prices is lacking. 
In particular, that model most intuitively applies an endogenous ‘benefit-of-the-doubt pricing’ 
in the absence of full price information. Further, we have discussed two extensions of the 
Banker  et al. model. First, we have shown how to proceed when reliable prices can be 
observed for subvectors of commodities, or when only cost or revenue data rather than pure 
quantity data are available for individual input or output dimensions. In addition, we have 
presented an economically consistent procedure for measuring ‘mix’ efficiency, which deals 
with the problem of zero implicit prices associated with the basic efficiency assessment 
model. 
It is worthwhile to stress once more that interpreting the results generated by the Banker et 
al. model in terms of technical efficiency can be tricky, since it builds on production 
assumptions (monotonicity and convexity) that are not generally tenable. In addition, this risk 
of specification error conflicts with the very nature of the non-parametric approach, which is 
often credited for imposing minimal (non-verifiable) structure on the production setting at 
hand. Therefore, we advocate the interpretation of the same results in terms of profit 
efficiency. In fact, that interpretation is all the more attractive since profit maximization and 
not technical efficiency maximization is conventionally used as a primal behavioral 
assumption. 
For completeness, we note that many practical applications consider scale efficiency as an 
integral component of technical  efficiency. Scale efficiency assessment boils down to 
comparing efficiency values as obtained relative to the convex monotone hull of the sample 
with those obtained with respect to a conical hull of the data, i.e. the technology 
representation obtained after adding constant returns to scale to the assumptions of convexity 
and monotonicity. We have abstracted from scale efficiency measurement. From the 
perspective upheld in this paper, constant returns to scale is an even more stringent 
technology assumption than convexity and monotonicity. In terms of profit maximization, 
using the conical hull of the data as the reference production set essentially implies 
benchmarking on a (long run) optimal profit level of zero under the endogenously selected 
prices. We did not use this reference set since the assumption of zero maximum profit does 
not seem generally tenable for the agricultural setting that we study. Moreover, we emphasize 
that our modeling assumptions do not a priori exclude maximum profit levels of zero; zero 
profit will be the benchmark if such is revealed from the data, i.e. a posteriori. In fact, we 
believe that letting the data speak for themselves in this way falls more in line with the non-
parametric philosophy. Still, it is worth to indicate that  our general insights are readily 
extended towards the case where one chooses to impose the benchmark of a zero maximum 
profit level. 
Our application to German agriculture illustrates the usefulness of the concomitant profit 
efficiency values for addressing specific research questions. Two possible critiques on the 
presented portfolio of statistical tools can be that (i) most test-statistics we used are originally 
designed to compare independent (sub)samples, whereas any efficiency value is de facto 
derived upon comparison with 'all other' netput vectors, and (ii) that we only tests necessary 
conditions, thus providing at best only lower bound estimates for the true profit efficiency 
measures. Yet, as regards the first critique, we repeat that interdependency can be mitigated 
via large samples such as ours, or, alternatively, via resampling techniques such as proposed   24
in Simar and Wilson (1998). Turning to the second critique, one can evidently disapprove of 
our statistical inferences by claiming that we have eventually little to say about the true profit 
efficiency of firms. Our equally evident answer is that such information is simply not 
available. We opt for a second-best route, accepting the position that full information is not 
always obtainable in practice. In fact, for the reasons listed above, we strongly believe that the 
non-parametric (asymptotic) tests bear clear indicative value. It simply is the best we can do 
with the given data; we exploit the (limited) information that is available to the fullest extent.  
At least, our results can give robust evidence for or against certain hypotheses. Inspection 
of the pattern of efficiency measures gives us insight in (a) the possible impact of product 
specialization, (b) the relationship between the assumption of profit maximization and 
ownership/incentive structures, and (c) the transition issue. Our main findings in these three 
respects can be summarized as follows: 
(a)  We find that the profit maximization hypothesis is violated much less 
systematically for pig and poultry farms than for other farm types. We think this 
feature arises because these latter farm types are much more prone to profit 
uncertainty, which is normally not taken up in the standard modeling of firm 
decision making.
21  
(b)  The basic neoclassical model of producer behavior abstracts from ownership 
structure. Yet, it is well known that principal-agent problems may bear on profit 
maximization. Our aggregate results are similar to those obtained by other 
authors: private farms fare best in this respect, followed by partnerships and 
corporate-style farms respectively. We find supplementary corroboration for the 
impact of farm organization on effort monitoring via the minimal consistency 
check on the shadow price of labor; as a rule this price is positive for privately 
owned farms, whereas it is zero for the overwhelming majority of corporate-style 
farms in our sample. 
(c)  Violations of the profit maximization hypothesis were stochastically larger in 
former East Germany. Obviously, this overall difference can partially be 
attributed to differences in ownership type, as large corporations and co-
operatives are typically found in former East Germany. Yet, there is persistent 
evidence for making a ceteris paribus distinction between East German and West 
German farms for the period that we considered. The difference between the two 
regions emerges when looking at the traditional DF efficiency measure but also if 
we compare mix efficiency results, thus suggesting that ‘wrong’ input mixes are 
an important source of inefficiency for East German farms. The limitations of 
these last assertions must be noted: we have mainly been concerned with a static 
analysis of differences between East and West since the short period covered by 
our sample prevents us to draw important conclusions regarding dynamic aspects. 
Using panel East German data, Mathijs and Swinnen (2001) report that the 
(technical) efficiency gap between LSOs and privately owned farms has decreased 
during transition.  It seems an interesting avenue for further research to combine 
both their and our framework, i.e. to conduct a dynamic analysis of profit 
efficiency with West German farms included.  
  
                                                                 
21 The analysis of effects of uncertainty on production decisions, and the study of underlying attitudes towards 
risk, has received some attention in the literature; see e.g. the recent studies by Appelbaum and Ullah (1997) and 
Kuosmanen and Post (2002).   25
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APPENDIX A: PRODUCT SPECIALIZATION, OWNERSHIP AND PROFIT EFFICIENCY 
Table A1 is the counterpart of table 3. It provides summary information on the main effect of 
production types on rank transformations of ?
A –values on the basis of two-way ANOVA analyses; see 
the main text for a discussion on how this table is constructed.  We find that production types have a 
clear impact on profit efficiency.  The results are in agreement with figure 3, which broadly seems to 
suggest the ordering pig and poultry ‘>’ mixed production ‘>’ crop ‘>’ livestock. 
 
Table A1: Production type and profit efficiency with corrections for ownership type 








 sum of aligned interblock 
ranks 
       
  102.15  310.95  361.17  266.41 
Difference with         
Crop farms  -208.80 (a)       
Livestock farms  -259.02 (a)  50.22 (a)     
Mixed Production  -164.26 (a)  -44.54   94.76 (a)   
         
Weighted sum of intrablock 
ranks 
       
(observed)  10.86  133.00  128.06  29.58 
         
Difference with expected (b)  -22.86  6.94  20.59  -4.67 
Notes:  (a) and (b) have a similar meaning as in table 3. 
 
We conclude our discussion of the influence of production specialization and farm ownership on 
profit efficiency by reporting some empirical results on the relation between the two former categories.  
Interdependency could be present if the productive process has an influence on the choice of 
organizational form, as thoroughly demonstrated by Allen and Lueck (1998). While our data are not 
optimal to check the rich microeconomic model used by these authors in a satisfying way, checking 
whether our explanatory variables are mutually independent is of course of interest in its own right. 
Table 1 in the main text shows the various combinations of ownership type and production type for 
our complete sample of 600 farms.  A chi-square test on these data does not allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis of independence.  The Cramér coefficient amounts to merely 0.002 so that we can safely 
assume that there is no association between organizational form and output specialization in our 
sample.  
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APPENDIX  B:  THE RELATIVE IMPACT  OF 
DF q AND 
M q ON THE OVERALL PROFIT EFFICIENCY 
MEASURE 
A q ; A FURTHER COMPARISON OF EAST GERMAN AND WEST GERMAN FARMS 
We claim that differences in input mix efficiency may be especially important to explain why East 
German farms are less successful in terms of the yardstick of profit maximization.  To further verify 
this claim, we conduct two simple tests, which are admittedly parametric, and hence somewhat 
tentative. 
From (13), it holds by definition that 
(B1)  lnlnln
ADFM qqq ”+ . 
To assess the impact of the mix-component on the overall profit efficiency value, we ran the wrong 
regression  01 lnln
ADF qbbq =+ , both for the East German and West German samples. In 
combination with our knowledge of the true coefficients in (B1), the mean squared error (MSE) can 
then be used to evaluate the relative importance of the omitted mix efficiency component. 
One drawback of starting from (B1) is that it is conceptually difficult to directly compare numerical 
values of the  DF and mix efficiency components. While both (10) and (11) are relative distance 
measures, the first pertains to the (normalized) Euclidean distance between two points, whereas the 
second may be regarded as an angular distance measure between two vectors. As an illustration, note 
that the seemingly high average mix efficiency value of 0.93 for all East German Farms would imply 
an angle of more than 20 degrees between vectors ox1 and ox2 in figure 3, i.e. about twice the angle for 
West German farms (with an average mix efficiency -value of 0.97). To facilitate comparisons, we 
therefore examine the regression coefficients ß1 and ß2 in the standardized multiple regression z(ln ?
A) 
= ß1 z(ln ?
DF) + ß2 z(ln ?
M) where z(ln (•)) is the standard normal transformation of logged efficiency 
values. 
Table B1 shows the results for both methods when respectively applied to East German and West 
German farms. The values obtained via method A are admittedly small, which reflects the residual 
nature of the mix-efficiency component in calculating the overall profit efficiency values, the different 
structure of the two distance measures, and the fact that equation B1 is expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Nevertheless, the bias (and MSE) introduced by omitting the mix-efficiency component is 
considerably higher for East German farms, which seems to validate our claim. The entries for method 
B indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in the logged 
M q -value ceteris paribus entails an 
increase of 0.127 standard deviation units of the overall gauge in the case of West German farms. This 
effect is larger for East German farms, while the opposite holds for the other component, again 
indicating the greater impact of the mix-efficiency component on the overall profit efficiency value. 
 
Table B1: Relative impact of the two components on overall profit efficiency 
  West German farms  East German farms 
Method A (omitted regressor)     
      Bias  3.928 x 10
-3  3.190 x 10
-2 
      Mean squared error  1.543 x 10
-5  1.018 x 10
-3 
Method B (standardized regression 
coefficients) 
   
      z(ln ?
DF)  0.988  0.957 
      z(ln ?
M)  0.127  0.163 
Note: the standard errors associated with the regression coefficients are approximately zero and 
the R² associated with the two regressions in method B equal approximately unity, as can be 
expected from the construction of the aggregate efficiency measure. 